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Interstate Compacts That Are for the Birds: 
A Proposal for Reconciling Federal Wetlands 
Protection with State Water Rights Through Federal-
Interstate Compacts* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A sense of time lies thick and heavy on such a place. Yearly since the 
ice age {the peat bog] has awakened each spring to the clangor of 
cranes. . . . The cranes stand, as it were, upon the sodden pages of 
their own history. 
* * * 
Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the 
pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values 
as yet uncaptured by language. The quality of cranes lies, I think, in 
this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words. 
Aldo Leopold1 
In 1850 Congress passed the General Swamp Land Act permitting 
states to select and acquire the unclaimed swampland within their 
boundaries. 2 Swampland was considered useless and Congress hoped 
that by giving it to the states, farmers would drain it and turn it into 
valuable farmland. 3 The plan worked too well. As with many early 
land disposition schemes, 4 the General Swamp Land Act was subject to 
* Copyright ill 1996 by Erik G. Davis. My working title was Section 404: The 
Creature from the Federal Lagoon. I also briefly considered calling this Comment simply 
Swamp Thing. I ruled both of these titles out, however, because I decided that for state water 
rights holders the phrase "federal wetlands protection" was at least as territying as anything 
that ever appeared in a Hollywood "B" movie. 
I wish to express thanks to Professor Ray Jay Davis who terrified a generation of BYU 
law students until his retirement last year. This paper could not have been written without 
Professor Davis' insights, experience, and occasional terrorizing. 
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 102-03 (Ballantine Books 1989) 
(1949). 
2. General Swamp Land Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850). 
3. Dalana W. Johnson, Saving the Wetlands from Agriculture: An Examination of 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the Conservation Provisions of the 1985 and 1990 
Farm Bills, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVT'L L. 299, 300 (1992) (citing S. REP. No. 357, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 215-16 (1990)). 
4. Squatting on the public lands was so common in early American history that 
Congress finally capitulated and legalized the practice in the General Preemption Act, ch. 16, 
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rampant abuse and fraud. One land agent for the State of Mississippi 
allegedly "judged as swampland all tracts over which a boat could pass 
[so he] drove a work animal 'hitched to a canoe across thousands of 
acres' of pinelands at fairly high elevations, listed his selections and, 
though contested by the Federal government, they were finally patented 
to the state. "5 The government originally intended to give away five to 
six million acres, but before the General Swamp Land Act was amended 
and finally repealed, more than eighty million acres of purported 
swampland had been selected, much of which was ultimately patented to 
the states and obtained by wealthy land speculators.6 
In this century Congress has recognized the enormous ecological and 
hydrological value of these lands. A change of terminology reflects this 
new understanding. What were "swamplands" in the nineteenth century 
are now "wetlands." Wetlands are some of the richest and most 
biologically diverse ecosystems in nature,7 but their importance is more 
than just ecological. Modern legislation recognizes the important 
recreational and aesthetic values that wetlands represent, as well as their 
essential role in flood control and water quality management. 8 Unfortu-
5 Stat. 453 (1841). an (unsuccessful) attempt to regulate squatting. GEORGE C. COGGINS ET 
AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 80-81 (3d ed. 1993). 
Other major land disposition and reclamation schemes subject to abuse included the 
Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862); the Graduation Act, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (1854); 
the Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U .S.C. §§ 321-
334 (1988)); the Kinkaid Act, ch. 1801, 33 Stat. 547 (1904) (repealed 1976); the Enlarged 
Homestead Act, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (1909) (repealed 1976); the Pickett Act, ch. 421, 36 
Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1943); and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 
(1916) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 299-301 (1988). Most of these were repealed 
by the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 
(1988). 
Grants to the railroads were so generous that the land disposition plan came to be known 
as "the Great Barbecue." CoGGINS, supra at 97. 
5. COGGINS, supra note 4, at 78 (citing PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW 
DEVELOPMENT 328 (1968)). 
6. /d. 
7. Michael R. Deland, No Net Loss of Wetlands: A Comprehensive Approach, 7 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 3; see also DAVID SALVESON, MITIGATING AND 
REGULATING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS, 15 fig. 1.3 (1990). 
8. Robert Beck cites what he calls "an exhaustive statement of wetland values" from 
an Illinois wetlands protection statute: 
(1) reducing flood damages by absorbing, storing and conveying peak flows from 
storms; 
(2) improving water quality by serving as sedimentation and filtering basins and as 
natural biological treatment areas; 
(3) providing breeding, nesting, forage and protective habitat for approximately 40 
percent of the State's threatened and endangered plants and animals, in addition to 
other forms of fish, wildlife, waterfowl and shorebirds; 
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nately, support for these values came only after much of the nation's 
wetlands had disappeared. In the past 200 years more than half of the 
wetlands in the lower forty-eight states have been destroyed. 9 Some 
states have lost over eighty percent of their wetlands. 10 Predictably, this 
loss of habitat has drastically reduced migratory bird and waterfowl 
populations, which by 1989 reached their lowest numbers in recorded 
history. 11 While many species inhabit wetlands, waterfowl are often 
monitored particularly closely. This is because they are good "indicator 
species," species whose vitality-like the canary in the coal mine-is 
indicative of the general health of the entire ecosystem. 
The federal government, belatedly recognizing the value of what it 
gave away 150 years ago, has in recent years developed a policy goal of 
"no net loss" of wetlands. 12 Any development projects that reduce the 
nation's total wetlands area must be offset by the creation of new 
wetlands. 13 Various state and federal regulatory and non-regulatory 
schemes manifest this "no net loss" policy. 14 Unfortunately, about 
(4) protecting underground water resources and helping to recharge rivers, streams 
and local or regional underground water supplies; 
(5) serving as recreational areas for hunting, fishing, boating, hiking, bird watching, 
photography and other uses; 
(6) providing open space and aesthetic values, particularly in rapidly developing areas; 
(7) providing unique educational and research opportunities because of their high 
diversity of plants and animals, their support for a high incidence of threatened and 
endangered species, and their function as a natural buffer for rivers, lakes and 
streams; 
(8) supplying nutrients in freshwater food cycles and serving as nursery areas and 
sanctuaries for young fish; and 
(9) helping to protect shorelines from the forces of erosion. 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 96 112, 1 9701-2(c), (cited in Robert E. Beck & C. Peter Goplerud III, 
Wetlands Preservation, 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 547, 548-49 (Robert E. Beck ed., 
1991)). 
9. Beck, supra note 8, at 548-49; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 299. 
10. Deland, supra note 7, at 3. 
II. See Beck, supra note 8, at 556 n.53 (citing [Current Developments] Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1433 (1989)). 
12. Memorandum of Agreement, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) (recording agreement 
between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency to maintain 
a policy of "no net loss" of wetlands); North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 1968 (1989) (touted by President Bush as the first step in implementing 
a "no net loss" policy); see also Beck, supra note 8, at 548; Deland, supra note 7, at 3. 
13. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 12; see generally Margot Zallen, The 
Mitigation Agreement-A Major Development in Wetland Regulation, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 19. 
14. Recent non-regulatory agricultural incentives, known as the "swampbuster" 
provisions, include the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198,99 Stat. 1566 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 19 and 42 U.S.C. (1988)), and the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(104 Stat.) 3359 (Title XIV of the Act codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3822-3824 (1991)) (amending 
328 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 10 
three-fourths of the remaining wetlands in the lower forty-eight states are 
now privately owned, largely because of the General Swamp Land Act 
and similar laws. 15 Converting swampland to farmland typified public 
land policy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, with the growing urgency of the wetlands situation, the federal 
government has increasingly regulated private wetlands and related water 
rights. 16 Not surprisingly, those who own the regulated land or water 
rights generally oppose such federal regulation. 
The federal government's principal regulatory tool for preserving 
wetlands and the focal point of the debate surrounding wetlands 
preservation is the Clean Water Act. 17 Section 404 of the Act requires 
a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to discharge any dredge or 
fill material in the nation's navigable waters (including wetlands), 18 but 
section 404's application is much broader than the words "dredge and fill 
permitting" suggest. Much controversy has surrounded the expansion of 
federal regulatory jurisdiction over land use under section 404, 19 but this 
Comment will deal less with land use conflicts than with water apportion-
ment disputes, which if somewhat less common, are no less divisive. 
Many who hold state water rights have been particularly frustrated by the 
effect of federal wetlands regulation on interstate compacts. 
The Constitution gives states the power to enter into compacts with 
other states, subject to the approval of Congress?° Compacts have been 
used to settle interstate conflicts throughout our country's history, but 
they were not used to resolve water allocation disputes until the early 
1920s. 21 The first interstate water compact was approved by Congress 
and written into law in 1925.22 This was the La Plata River Compact, 
signed by Colorado and New Mexico. 23 Professor Felix Frankfurter 
(later Justice Frankfurter) was so enamored with the idea that he 
published an article with James M. Landis that same year in the Yale Law 
the Food Security Act of 1985). Other federal legislation has been enacted in the last decade 
aimed exclusively at protecting wetlands, especially the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645,100 Stat. 3582 (1986), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951-3956(1991), and the 
North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 1968 (1989). 
15. Deland, supra note 7, at 3; see also SALVESON, supra note 7, at 19 fig. 1.5. 
16. Deland, supra note 7, at 3-4. 
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see Beck, supra note 8, at 557. 
18. 33 U .S.C. § 1344 (1988). 
19. See, e.g., James W. Sanderson, Section 404: Federal Interference with State and 
Local Land Use? 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 6. 
20. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 3. 
21. Douglas L. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts between the States, 6 WATERS 
AND WATER RIGHTS 549, 549 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). 
22. !d. 
23. La Plata River Compact, 43 Stat. 796 (Jan. 29, 1925). 
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Journaf24 in which they enthusiastically praised the notion of interstate 
compacts and expressed their hope that the use of such compacts would 
soon become general. 25 In the seventy-odd years since Frankfurter and 
Landis published their article, this hope has largely been realized as 
interstate water compacts have proliferated. There are now at least 
twenty-one interstate compacts apportioning the water rights to various 
rivers or river systems throughout the United States, and other compacts 
governing various aspects of water management. 26 
This Comment examines the section 404 permitting process and how 
it affects interstate water allocations under interstate compacts. Part I 
discusses the section 404 permitting process, including jurisdictional 
disputes and the scope of the Clean Water Act. Part II examines 
particular water allocation problems that have arisen because of conflicts 
between federal wetlands preservation and state and local water laws. 
Part III examines how these conflicts affect interstate water allocation. 
Finally, Part IV proposes resolutions to these conflicts, concluding that 
federal-interstate water compacts are the best solution. 
II. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE SECTION 404 PERMITTING 
PROGRAM 
For [the whooping cranes], the song of the power shovel came near to 
being an elegy. The high priests of progress knew nothing of cranes, 
and cared less. What is a species more or less among engineers? What 
good is an undrained marsh anyhow ?21 
Until 1972 the role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
"Corps") was limited largely to improving navigation and rendering 
technical assistance to states for bridge and dam construction. Any 
contact the Corps had with wetlands consisted of simply draining 
swamps. In 1972 Congress passed amendments to the National Water 
Pollution Control Act which were intended "to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."28 
One of these amendments was the addition of section 404, which requires 
anyone who wishes to discharge dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters of the United States to first obtain a permit from the 
24. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A 
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925). 
25. Grant, supra note 21, at 552. 
26. /d. at 549-51. 
27. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 107. 
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
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Secretary of the Army through the Corps.Z9 Five years later the 1972 
Amendments became the Clean Water Act. 30 
Early controversies surrounding section 404 concerned the jurisdic-
tion of the Corps of Engineers' permitting program and the definition of 
"navigable waters" as used in section 404(a)Y Originally, the Corps was 
reluctant to apply the program vigorously and required section 404 
permits only on traditionally navigable waters as interpreted under the 
River and Harbor Act of 1899,32 the Corps' original grant of jurisdic-
tion.33 In 1975 environmental groups sued the Secretary of the Army, 
forcing the Corps to expand its jurisdiction to include those waters 
included generally under the Clean Water Act's statutory definition in 
section 502(7). 34 This section defines navigable waters as "waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas. "35 This broad definition 
significantly enlarged the Corps' jurisdiction. In subsequent regulations, 
the Corps interpreted "waters" to include wetlands36 and wetlands 
adjacent to waters of the United States. 37 As one judge explained, the 
new definition put any "moist land adjacent to a creek" under the 
permitting jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers.38 It may appear that 
this regulation stretches the definition of "navigable waters of the United 
States" beyond all recognition. One should remember, however, that it 
traditionally takes very little water to navigate a boat across swamplands 
or wetlands in the United States. 39 
Further litigation was necessary to define "dredge and fill materi-
al, "40 "wetlands," and "adjacent wetlands." In the end, the Supreme 
Court also defined these terms broadly. 41 In United States v. Riverside 
29. !d. at§ 1344(a). The Corps' authority to administer this program is based on the 
Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, a piece of legislation that was discovered and resuscitat-
ed by environmental activists in the 1960s and used as a federal pollution control statute until 
passage of the Clean Water Act. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 
§ 9.03[2] (1994). 
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); see also SALVESON, supra note 7, at 29 fig 2.1. 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). 
32. !d. at§ 403. 
33. Beck, supra note 8, at 558 (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th 
Cir. 1978)). 
34. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 
1975). 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988). 
36. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1994). 
37. !d. § 328.3(a)(7). 
38. United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 194 (1988) (Merrit, J., concurring). 
39. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
40. See, e.g., AvoyellesSportsmen's Leaguev. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. La. 
1979) (holding that the clearing of vegetation from a periodically inundated area was subject 
to a § 404 permit). 
41. See Beck, supra note 8, at 559-60. 
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Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit holding 
that would have restricted section 404's application to areas frequently 
flooded by navigable waters. 42 Instead, the Court determined that 
Congress intended to apply the Clean Water Act as broadly as possible 
under the Commerce Clause.43 Consequently, the Court upheld the 
Corps' definition of wetlands, which does not require flooding by surface 
waters, but only proximity to navigable waters and sufficient saturation 
to support typical wetland vegetation.44 Broad readings of section 404's 
statutory language have expanded the Corps of Engineers' already 
expansive regulatory power over state water rights and land development 
activities. Section 404 provides some exemptions from the permitting 
requirements, principally for traditional agriculture and silviculture 
activities. 45 These exemptions, however, have been narrowly construed 
by the courts. 46 
The Corps' section 404 permitting program is subject to federal 
environmental regulations, including the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)47 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).48 For example, 
42. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985). 
43. /d. at 133. The congressional record seems clear on this point. A memorandum 
introduced by Congressman Dingell asserting Congress' broad powers under the commerce 
clause states: 
[T]his new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies including main streams and 
their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, narrow definitions 
of navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters 
covered by this bill. Indeed, the conference report states on page 144: "The 
conferees fully intend that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been 
made or may be made for administrative purposes." 
House Consideration of the Report of the Conference Comm., Oct. 4, 1972, S. REP. No. 1, 
93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 250-51 (1973) (Statement of Rep. Dingell, quoted in 
TARLOCK, supra note 29, at§ 9.03[2]). 
44. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1994). This section of the Corps' regulations defines 
wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a 
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, 
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands 
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." /d. 
45. 33 U .S.C. § 1344(t)(l)(a) (1988). 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring a§ 404 
permit for a new dike and drainage system to convert former wetlands to agricultural uses); see 
also Beck, supra note 8, at 562; DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW 387 (1990); TARLOCK, 
supra note 29, at§ 9.06[2][a]; Johnson, supra note 3, at 304-06 n.54. 
47. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4370 (1986). 
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988). Other federal laws that are incorporated by 
implication in § 404 include the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-662 
(1988), Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1276 (1988), and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464(1988). See also FRANK J. TRELEASE & GEORGE 
A. GOULD, WATER LAW 759 (4th ed., 1986). 
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section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to preserve the habitat of 
threatened and endangered species. 49 This section was invoked to deny 
a permit for dam construction on Wildcat Creek in Colorado because the 
diversion would probably leave insufficient water in the Upper Platte 
River to protect critical whooping crane habitat far downstream in 
Nebraska. 5° Because a permit is required even for purely private dredge 
and fill projects in the navigable waters of the United States,51 section 
404 insures a full environmental review of some activities of private 
parties not otherwise affected by federal environmentallegislation.52 
Although recent years have seen a "greening" of the Corps of 
Engineers, the Corps' mission has historically concerned navigation and 
water resource development, not environmental protection. The 
environmental role traditionally belongs to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which plays an important part in section 404 administra-
tion. Because of the EPA's decidedly environmentalist bent, developers 
and their advocates have been disturbed by the EPA's broad powers 
under section 404. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act 
indicates that the more development-minded House and the more 
environmentally-minded Senate compromised to use the EPA as a check 
on the Corps' power. 53 Subsections (b) and (c) of section 404 give the 
EPA broad powers of oversight to regulate the permitting program, 
which is essentially administered by the Corps of Engineers.54 Under 
subsection (b), the Administrator of the EPA promulgates guidelines that 
the Corps must follow in issuing section 404 permits. The Clean Water 
Act requires these guidelines to be based on criteria set out for ocean 
discharges in subsection 403(c), which reflects mostly environmental 
concerns.55 Under subsection 404(c), the EPA has power to review and 
49. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (1985). 
50. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985). 
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). 
52. GETCHES, supra note 46, at 388. 
53. Sanderson, supra note 19, at 8. 
54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(b),(c) (1988). 
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c) (1988). The criteria to be taken into account include: 
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or welfare, including but not 
limited to plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches; 
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including the transfer, 
concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their by-products through biological, 
physical, and chemical processes; changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivi-
ty, and stability; and species and community population changes; 
(C) the effect of disposal of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and economic values; 
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of pollutants; 
(E) the effect of the disposal at varying rates, of particular volumes and concentrations 
of pollutants; 
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veto the Corps' decisions to issue dredge and fill permits. Although the 
Corps vigorously contends that EPA vetoes have little effect on its 
permitting decisions, 56 some critics claim that the EPA is biased against 
development interests and uses its veto power as a "vehicle for driving 
the entire Section 404 program from the tail-end of the process. "57 
III. HOW FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION AFFECTS STATE WATER 
RIGHTS 
The county records may allege that you own this pasture, but the plover 
airily rules out such trivia/legalities. He has just flown 4,000 miles to 
reassert the title he got from the Indians, and until the young plovers 
are a-wing, this pasture is his, and none may trespass without his 
protest. 
* * * 
In farm country, the plover has only two real enemies: the gully and the 
drainage ditch. Perhaps we shall one day find that these are our 
enemies too. 58 
A. Does Section 404 Actually Affect State Water Rights? 
The extent to which section 404 actually affects water allocation 
under state water law is the subject of some controversy. Dan Tarlock 
has argued that when combined with the Endangered Species Act, the 
effect of section 404 on state water diversion and impoundment projects 
is so substantial that it creates a de facto federal water right-what he 
calls a federal "regulatory property right. "59 Federal regulatory rights, 
to the extent that they are recognized at all today, are acknowledged to 
be merely a "conceptual analysis" 60-a convenient way of talking about 
the federal government's regulatory power over state water rights. But 
in the late 1970s, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior briefly 
asserted the actual existence of federal "non-reserved" water rights 
(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of pollutants 
including land-based alternatives; and 
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans, such as mineral exploitation and 
scientific study. 
56. Lance D. Wood, Section 404: Federal Wetlands Regulation Is Essential, 7 NAT 
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 7, 55. 
57. William B. Ellis, Section 404(c): Where is the Balance?, 7 NAT RESOURCES & 
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 25, 65. 
58. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
59. A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND 
& WATER L. REV. I, 1 (1985). 
60. !d. at 26. 
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"arising out of land management functions of the federal agencies. "61 
While the Secretary no longer maintains this position, federal agency 
authority over private water rights remains a difficult issue. 
Certainly in 1972 when Congress enacted section 404 to amend the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act it did not intend to create a new 
federal water right. In fact, Congress did not necessarily intend to affect 
water allocation quantities at all; the legislation's primary purpose was to 
improve the quality of the nation's waters. 62 If Congress foresaw any 
effects on private water rights, these effects must have appeared minor 
and incidental. In fact, during the first few years after its passage, 
section 404's impact on state and local water law was not fully appar-
ent. 63 It was not until the late 1970s when the EPA had completed its 
regulatory guidelines and section 404 began to be used with other 
environmental statutes that the new law's use as an environmental 
regulatory tool became apparent. 64 
There is still debate about whether section 404's effect on state water 
rights is more than minimal. 65 Clearly what Frank Trelease argued 
regarding federal reserved rights cannot be claimed for the section 404 
program. Trelease wrote in 1977 that water resource developers' fears 
about federal reserved rights ultimately amounted to little more than 
"crying wolf. "66 But while wetlands regulation and federal reservations 
61. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979),(cited 
in Lawrence MacDonnell, Federal Interests in Western Water Resources: Conflict and 
Accommodation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 389, 398 (1989)). This statement, known as the 
Krulitz opinion, was essentially withdrawn after Secretary Watt came to the Department of the 
Interior on the basis of a study issued by the Department of Justice concluding that no federal 
water rights exist under FLPMA or the Taylor Grazing Act. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion 
No. M-36914 (Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management), 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981), cited 
in MacDonnell, supra at 398. To my knowledge federal regulatory water rights have not been 
reasserted since the Krulitz administration. 
62. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988); Sanderson, supra note 19, at 6, 
8-9. 
63. Lawrence MacDonnell remarks that "[m]uch has been written about the many ways 
in which water quality regulation could affect the availability of water for consumptive use. 
In fact there has been surprisingly little direct conflict along these lines." MacDonnell, supra 
note 61, at 400. However, whether "surprisingly little" means that there is in fact little conflict 
or simply that the conflicts resulting from § 404's implementation have been somewhat less 
catastrophic than anticipated is unclear. In fact, and as MacDonnell points out, it is the indirect 
effects of the Clean Water Act, among which he includes the § 404 permitting program, that 
have raised problems. /d. 
64. See Ellis, supra note 57, at 63. 
65. See Sanderson, supra note 19; Wood, supra note 56. 
66. Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENVER L.J. 473, 492 
(1977). Trelease points out that as far as federal reserved rights go, '"not a single case of 
harm has been reported,' that 'for all the outcry ... not one state, not one county, not one 
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are similarly benign in some ways-both are typically non-consumptive, 
instream uses-wetlands differ from reserved rights in other important 
ways. For instance, they are not typically limited to mountainous 
upstream areas. But most importantly, unlike federal reserved rights, 
section 404 has in fact been invoked to protect wetlands at the expense 
of various water development plans. Still, it is clear that the program has 
not made development of water and land resources impossible. 
Lance Wood, chief counsel on Environmental Law and Regulatory 
Programs for the Corps, argues that the section 404 program is typically 
deferential and that it interferes with state and local laws only when they 
clearly conflict with federal interestsY Of the more than 90,000 
projects the Corps reviews each year, only about 500 are denied a section 
404 permit. 68 Wood also argues that the EPA's influence over the 
Corps permit decisions is slight to non-existent. Since the creation of the 
section 404 permitting program in 1972, the EPA had, as of 1992, 
exercised its veto power a total of only eleven times, and the Corps 
claims that these decisions have had little impact on their permitting 
program. 69 
On the other hand, critics of the section 404 program claim that 
"only the naive would conclude that EPA is not ... intending the [veto] 
action to 'drive' the program. "70 James Sanderson argues that judicial 
glosses on section 404 have allowed the EPA to extend the jurisdictional 
and theoretical reach of the statute far beyond the simple water quality 
goals that Congress intended to address when it originally passed ·the 
National Water Pollution Control Act amendments in 1972.71 Others 
complain that the courts and federal agencies have failed to balance 
environmental concerns with "social interests" (read "development 
interests") in the way that Congress intended when it split the permitting 
authority and the veto power between the Corps of Engineers and the 
municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come 
forward to plead and prove that the United States ... has destroyed any private right."' !d. 
at 491 (quoting Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of 
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1964) (Statement 
of Senator Clifford P. Anderson)). In 1988 John Leshy reconfirmed that what Trelease 
recognized in 1977 is still true today, and particularly so in the case of federal wilderness area 
reserved rights. For all the concern about federal non-Indian reserved rights the reservation 
of such rights has had an extremely minimal effect on state water allocation. John D. Leshy, 
Water and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 389 (1988). 
67. Wood, supra note 56, at 10. 
68. /d. at 54. 
69. /d. at 55. 
70. Sanderson, supra note 19, at 9. 
71. /d. at 54. 
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EPA under section 404(c). 72 William Ellis points out that while EPA 
vetoes of Corps permitting decisions are rare (he counts twelve since 
1972),73 this is due more to delays in promulgating EPA regulations 
than to any kind of agency restraint. 74 He also notes that "the last five 
EPA vetoes have all been public water resource projects, "75 and 
concludes that "EPA's vetoes of these projects plainly reveal its current 
domination of both the Corps and the section 404 program. "76 
Congress was aware of the potential for conflict with state water laws 
when it passed the Clean Water Act. The issue is addressed explicitly in 
section 510(g) of the Act, which recognizes state water rights only to the 
extent of creating an exception to them in the Act: "Except as expressly 
provided in this chapter, nothing . . . shall . . . be construed as impairing 
or in any manner affecting any right of jurisdiction of the States with 
respect to the waters ... of such States. "77 
In 1977, legislation known as the Wallop AmendmenC8 was added 
to the policy section of the Clean Water Act with the purpose of defusing 
tension between state water law and federal regulatory powers under the 
Clean Water Act. It states: 
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate 
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, 
abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further 
policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been 
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State 
and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, 
72. Ellis, supra note 57, at 28. 
73. /d. at 64. Wood counts eleven. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. This 
inconsistency can be explained by the fact that the Ware Creek Reservoir Project was actually 
vetoed twice because of judicial invalidation of the first veto. Ellis, supra note 57, at 64. 
74. Ellis, supra note 57, at 62. 
75. !d. at 64. Interestingly, four of these vetoes have resulted in litigation: (1) City of 
Alma v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (contesting EPA veto of lake con-
struction, Lake Alma, Bacon County, Georgia, 54 Fed. Reg. 6749 (Feb. 14, 1989)); (2) James 
City County v. EPA, 758 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Va. 1990) (contesting EPA veto of municipal 
water supply project, Ware Creek Reservoir, James City County, Virginia (July 10, 1989), 54 
Fed. Reg. 33,608 (Aug. 15, 1989)); (3) Alameda Water & Sanitation District v. Reilly, No. 
91-M-2047 (D. Colo. filed Nov. 22, 1991) (contesting EPA veto of a municipal water supply 
project, Two Forks Dam and Reservoir, Water supply impoundment, Jefferson County, 
Colorado (Nov. 23, 1990), 56 Fed. Reg. 76 (Jan. 2, 1991)); (4) James City County v. EPA, 
12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993) (On remand, the James City County Project, supra number (2), 
was vetoed again by the EPA. Ware Creek Reservoir, James City County, Virginia (March 
27, 1992)). 
76. Ellis, supra note 57, at 64. 
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (1988) (emphasis added). 
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988). 
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reduce, and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing 
water resources. 79 
Shortly after the passage of this amendment a Corps decision to deny a 
section 404 permit for a dam on Wildcat Creek was challenged as, among 
other things, a federal intrusion upon state water allocation law, contrary 
to the policy statement in section 510(g) of the Clean Water Act. 80 The 
Tenth Circuit Court held that as a statement of policy, the Wallop 
Amendment "'cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, 
even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly stated pur-
pose. '" 81 
The Ninth Circuit Court reached the same conclusion in United 
States v. Akers. 82 In that case the Corps had required a California 
farmer to obtain a section 404 permit before cultivating a wetlands area 
on his farm, but the permit requirement infringed on the farmer's water 
rights under state lawY The court held that "any incidental effect on 
Akers' rights to state allocated water from the Pit River is justified 
because protection of Big Swamp is the type of legitimate purpose for 
which the act was intended. "84 
While encouraging cooperation between federal and state agencies, 
the Wallop Amendment, as currently understood by the courts, does not 
prevent federal agencies from interfering with state water allocation if the 
agency can show a legitimate regulatory purpose for its action. 
Another subject of controversy is the extent of EPA control over the 
section 404 process. This includes its authority to promulgate the 
regulations for the permitting program and its power to veto decisions of 
79. /d.; cf THE BOOK OF MORMON, 3 Nephi 11: 28-30: 
... And there shall be no disputations among you, as there have hitherto been; 
neither shall there be disputations among you concerning the points of my doctrine, 
as there have hitherto been. 
For verily, verily I say unto you, he that hath the spirit of contention is not of 
me [Jesus Christl. but is of the devil, who is the father of contention, and he stirreth 
up the hearts of men to contend with anger, one with another. 
Behold, this is not my doctrine, to stir up the hearts of men with anger, one 
against another; but this is my doctrine, that such things should be done away. 
Unfortunately, the policy expressed in the Wallop amendment has fared no better than the 
doctrine expressed in Jesus' admonition to the Nephites. The broad language of both has left 
loopholes that have been exploited by the truly contentious. 
80. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985). 
81. /d. at 513 (quoting Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 
u.s. 515, 527 (1945)). 
82. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986). 
83. /d. at 817. 
84. /d. at 821 (citing statements of Senator Wallop from the legislative history, 3 Leg. 
Hist. 532, Senate Debate, Dec. 5, 1977). 
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the Corps granting dredge and fill permits.85 Though exercised rarely, 
many believe the EPA's veto power has a tremendous effect on all 
section 404 permit decisions. 86 This could signify an increasing impact 
of section 404 on state water rights, since the EPA's five most recent 
vetoes have all involved public water projects. 87 A 1994 case highlights 
the regulatory power of the EPA under section 404. In James City 
County v. EPA, the Fourth Circuit Court upheld an EPA decision to veto 
a section 404 permit for a municipal water supply reservoir. The court 
held that the EPA's veto was valid even if based on purely environmental 
concerns, without regard for the county's water needs. 88 
Plaintiffs in many of the cases challenging both EPA and Corps 
decisions have an uphill battle because they must usually show the 
agency's action was "arbitrary and capricious [or] an abuse of discre-
tion. "89 This is a difficult standard of review for any plaintiff to 
meet. 90 
B. Section 404 Permit Denials and Regulatory Takings Claims 
Some landowners and water rights holders have attempted to limit 
section 404's effect on private rights by claiming that the denial of a 
section 404 permit constitutes a taking of property without compensation 
contrary to the Fifth Amendment. 91 Since at least 1922 the Supreme 
Court has recognized regulatory takings-cases in which regulation of 
property becomes so severe that a property interest is infringed upon and 
compensation must be paid.92 But claims that section 404 permit denials 
constitute a regulatory taking have been largely unsuccessful. 93 Beck 
notes that, "courts faced with the [takings] question in the section 404 
context have found either minimal depreciation of the property or no 
depreciation resulting from the denial of the permit. These cases 
emphasize the idea that a property owner is not guaranteed the highest 
85. See Ellis, supra note 57. 
86. /d. at 64-65. 
87. /d. at 64. 
88. James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 87 (1994). 
89. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (1986). 
90. See, e.g., James City County, 12 F.3d at 1337-39. 
91. See Want, The Taking Defense to Wetlands Regulation, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10, 169 (1984). 
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
93. Smithwick v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1981); Jentgen v. United States, 
657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
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and best use of property. "94 The few successful takings claims based 
on a permit denial have involved a valid pre-existing land use disallowed 
by the imposition of the section 404 permitting program. None of them 
has involved a claim for the taking of a water right. 95 
In 1992 the Supreme Court revisited the regulatory takings question 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 96 Justice Scalia articulated 
the general rule in this case by stating that " [ w ]hen the owner of real 
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses 
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economi-
cally idle, he has suffered a taking. "97 The requirement that all 
beneficial uses be destroyed by the state action precludes most takings 
claims under section 404. But the question remains as to whether water 
rights holders under a prior appropriation scheme have a valid claim. 
Courts generally hold that water rights are vested rights in western 
states;98 if federal regulations under Clean Water Act section 404 
prohibit use of a water right, the right holder may have a takings claim 
against the government. 99 
However, even if a water right holder could prove he or she had 
been denied all economically beneficial uses ofthe water, a second hurdle 
must be overcome to prove a taking. Courts have long recognized a 
nuisance exception to the general rule of takings, by which governments 
may forbid harmful uses of property under their police power. In Lucas 
the Court narrowed this exception to cases in which the regulation "does 
not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under 
relevant property and nuisance principles. "100 To explain how this rule 
would work, Scalia writes "the owner of a lake bed, for example, would 
not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to 
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding 
others' land." 101 This would seem to put section 404 permitting within 
the nuisance exception to takings claims, but by limiting the exception to 
94. Beck, supra note 8, at 572. 
95. 1902 Atlantic, Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983); 1902 Atlantic 
Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 31 Env't. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1835 (CI. Ct. 1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 31 Env't. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1847 (CI. Ct. 1990); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992). But 
see Ciampitti v. United States, 32 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (CI. Ct. 1990); Dufau v. 
United States, 32 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1524 (CI. Ct. 1990). 
96. 112 S.Ct 2886 (1992). 
97. !d. at 2895. 
98. Zachary L. McCormick, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts in the Western United 
States-Some Suggestions, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385, 394 (1994). 
99. !d. 
100. 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
101. !d. at 2900. 
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common law principles of nuisance, the Court apparently excluded 
exceptions to the takings law based on modern congressional notions of 
harmful activities. 102 
In the case of wetlands regulation, the common law would thus 
uphold Corps permit decisions intended to protect against such hydrolog-
ical threats as undue flooding or erosion, but might not find a nuisance 
exception in Corps decisions and EPA vetoes aimed at protecting against 
ecological threats. This may leave section 404 permit denials open to 
takings claims when they are made in the interest of environmental and 
other more esoteric values associated with wetlands. Especially 
vulnerable may be decisions such as the EPA's veto of the Ware Creek 
municipal water development project, which was justified on purely 
environmental grounds. 103 Some commentators have questioned 
whether the Lucas decision would apply to takings claims for natural 
resources since these resources are generally controlled by federal law 
rather than by common law. 104 But water is an exception. It is still 
controlled by state law and might therefore be subject to regulatory 
takings claims, at least in western states .105 However, in general it 
remains true that section 404 does not easily lend itself to takings claims 
for water rights. 106 
Whether one chooses to characterize section 404's impact on state 
water law as "minimal" or "excessive," it is undeniable that conflicts 
between state law and wetlands protection under section 404 have 
generated abundant litigation. The case law growing out of the Clean 
Water Act's section 404 has only exacerbated the fears of most state 
water rights holders and their advocates. 
102. /d. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The majority's emphasis] on the common 
law of nuisance is too narrow a con tine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and 
interdependent society. The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory 
initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expec-
tations, whatever their source."). 
103. James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993). This particular case 
probably would not give rise to a takings claim because it took place in Virginia and involved 
a riparian water right. However, if the Corps or the EPA follow this case in the West, the 
regulatory takings question may arise. 
104. See COGGINS, supra note 4, at 249-51. 
105. See Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1991). 
106. But see TARLOCK, supra note 29, at§ 9.06[1] (arguing that "[a] severe curtailment 
of an existing right could be a compensable taking," but admitting that "most challenges will 
fail because they are not ripe or the federal government has sufficiently accommodated the state 
right"). 
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IV. HOW FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION AFFECTS STATE 
WATER ALLOCATIONS UNDER INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
[Ojn cool August nights you can hear their whistled signals as [the 
young plovers] set wing for the pampas, to prove again the age-old 
unity of the Americas. Hemisphere solidarity [and interstate solidarity} 
is new among statesmen, but not among the feathered navies of the 
sky. 101 
A. The Interstate Compact 
341 
Because the waters of most rivers are not confined within the borders 
of any one state, and because water law is predominantly state law, 
conflicts over the allocation of interstate streams are particularly difficult 
to resolve. Various methods of resolving interstate water disputes have 
evolved, but it is generally conceded that the most effective means of 
allocating water between states is the interstate compact. 108 
Congress can allocate the waters of interstate streams, but it has done 
so only rarely and with, at best, mixed results. 109 Statutory allocation 
is not ideal, first because it takes the issue completely out of the hands of 
the states, and second because a congressional statute gives the allocation 
such permanence and force that inequities or outright stupidities written 
into the law are almost impossible to remedy. 110 Gratefully, statutory 
107. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 38. 
108. Jerome C. Muys, Allocation and Management of Interstate Water Resources: The 
Emergence of the Federal-Interstate Compact, 6J. INT'L L. & Pot!Y 307, 311 (1976); George 
W. Sherk, Resolving Interstate Water Conflicts in the Eastern United States: The Re-
Emergence of the Federal-Interstate Compact, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 397, 406 (1994). 
109. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t 
(effecting a statutory apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River between Upper Basin 
states (Colorado, Utah, Wyoming) and Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, Nevada)); 
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 
3295 (1990) (apportioning the rights of the Truckee River Basin between California, Nevada, 
and federal interests represented by the Pyramid Lake band of the Paiute Nation). 
110. The Boulder Canyon Project Act was "intended to put an end to the long-standing 
dispute over Colorado River Waters." Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560 (1963). 
Instead it was the foundation for a whole new line of cases with names that sound like PAC 
10 football matchups. Arizona v. California, is just one instance. 
Another recent example of the drawbacks inherent in statutory apportionment has come 
with the growth of Las Vegas. Because the Boulder Canyon Project Act allocates water from 
the Colorado River but not its tributaries, Las Vegas may be forced to construct a diversion 
from the Virgin River at enormous waste and expense and at the jeopardy of an endangered 
species, the Virgin River Chub. If not for the terms of the statutory apportionment, Las Vegas 
could "wheel" the same water through Lake Mead at a fraction of the cost. See Ryan Dennett, 
Las Vegas and the Virgin River: Cashing in on a Jackpot in the Southern Desert 28-31 (Dec. 
16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, on file at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library). 
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allocation has been used only when states are completely unable to reach 
a satisfactory agreement on their own. 111 Judicial solutions, including 
adjudication or litigation before the Supreme Court, tend to be equally 
slow and possibly more expensive. 112 The Supreme Court's hesitancy 
to involve itself in fractious interstate water controversies is under-
standable, and the Court has acknowledged that litigation is really a fairly 
blunt instrument unsuited for the extremely complex factual consider-
ations, changing circumstances and unique local issues that interstate 
water allocation requires. 113 
Allocating interstate water rights through compacts has numerous 
advantages, two of which Felix Frankfurter and James Landis recognized 
in 1925. 114 First, because the negotiation process that leads to the 
adoption of a compact is unconstrained by strict legal rules, compacts 
permit parties to reach a mutually beneficial "sensible compromise" 
outside the adversarial context of the courtroom. 115 Second, compacts 
are more versatile and better able to adjust to changing circumstances 
than a judicial decision allocating water rights could ever be. 116 This 
is particularly true of water compacts, since many compacts-nearly two-
thirds of the existing apportionment compacts-provide for the creation 
of a perpetual compact commission to administer the agreement. 117 
Third, the establishment of compacts helps stabilize ownership rights in 
the water of interstate streams, making investment less risky and thus 
providing for the full development of interstate water resources. 118 In 
111. Both the Boulder Dam Project Act and the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water 
Rights Settlement Act were passed only after literally decades of negotiations were unable to 
bring the various parties to an agreement. 
112. GETCHES, supra note 46, at 402-03; Muys, supra note 108, at 310-11. 
113. In Nebraska v. Wyoming the Court bemoaned the inadequacy of the judicial system 
to resolve interstate water controversies: 
[T]hese controversies between the States over the waters of interstate streams "involve 
the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due 
to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration 
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may 
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact 
clause of the Federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has said of 
interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement 
should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our 
adjudicatory power." 
325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945), cited in Muys, supra note 108, at 310-11. 
114. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24. 
115. !d. at 706 (quoted in Grant, supra note 21, at 552). 
116. !d. at 701, 707 (also quoted in Grant, supra note 21, at 552). 
117. Grant, supra note 21, at 559 (citing Carver, Interstate Compacts Appendix, in NEW 
SOURCES OF WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH: INTERBASIN TRANSFERS 
(Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, June 7-10, 1982). 
118. See Grant, supra note 21, at 573. 
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the cases of the Colorado River and the Snake River, Congress made the 
establishment of an interstate agreement a precondition to its funding the 
development of the river. 119 
B. Recent Challenges to Interstate Compacts 
Recently, however, some have questioned the ability of interstate 
compacts to accomplish the ends that Frankfurter and Landis found so 
valuable. 120 The development of the federal reserved rights doc-
trine, 121 and increasing federal regulatory power over the nation's wa-
ters-environmental regulations in particular-have created a serious 
challenge for many interstate water compacts. A good example of such 
a challenge is the Clean Water Act's section 404 permitting program. 
Because interstate compacts usually incorporate state water law in 
their allocations, section 404's impacts on individual water rights also 
affect water allocation under interstate compacts. Water users in an up-
stream state may be forced to let their allocation run by their land and out 
of the state, thus upsetting not only their plans and expectations, but also 
the balance achieved between states by compact. 
In only one reported instance has wetlands preservation under section 
404 of the Clean Water Act interfered with the water allocation of an 
interstate compact. 122 One of the arguments raised by the Colorado 
irrigation company in Riverside was that the section 404 permit denial 
would prevent Colorado from diverting and using the water allocated to 
it under the South Platte River Compact. 123 The district court held that 
Congress has the power to enact legislation that conflicts with and 
overrides a prior compact, even if its effect is to alter interstate water 
compact allocations. 124 But Judge McKay's circuit court opinion specifi-
119. /d.; see also Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48 
(1966) (suggesting that "[m]ost compacts" were negotiated in an effort to obtain "federal 
benefits ... contingent upon agreement being reached"); Blaine Cannon, The Snake River 
Compact: Facing an Uncertain Future, 2 (Dec. 16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, on file 
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library) (noting that the Snake River Compact was 
negotiated after the federal government made it a prerequisite to any federal funding for 
construction of the Palisades dam) (citing Letter from R.J. Newell, Federal Representative, 
Snake River Compact Commission, to R.F. Bessey, Chairman, Pac. Northwest Field Commit-
tee, Department of the Interior 2 (Dec. 13, 1949) (copy on file with Blaine Cannon). 
120. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 24-25. 
121. See United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546 (1963). See LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER 
LAW 108-11 (1987) (discussing the development of the federal "reserved rights" doctrine). 
122. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985). 
123. 758 F.2d at 513-14. It has been suggested by some commentators that the invocation 
of the ESA and § 404 was simply a device used by Nebraska farmers to circumvent the 
interstate allocation under the agreement. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 20. 
124. 758 F.2d at 589-90. 
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cally refuses to address the question of compact preemption and finds for 
the Corps on other grounds. 125 
That congressional legislation can supersede an interstate compact 
seems consistent with the theory of interstate compacts. 126 Felix 
Frankfurter and James Landis argue that when giving congressional 
approval to interstate compacts: 
Congress does not surrender any of its powers; it merely finds no 
occasion for its present exercise of them. There is, therefore, no 
"delegation" of its power in any legally significant use of the term. But 
Congress does not foreclose the future. If and when circumstances 
which now call for solution through compact change, Congress is 
wholly free to assume control. 127 
Although it has been argued that Congress should be bound by an 
interstate compact it ratified, the Supreme Court answered the question 
unequivocally in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. : 128 
"Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two states would possess the 
power to modify and alter the Constitution itself. "129 
The Wheeling decision specifically precluded enforcement of the 
compact when its effect would have limited Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause; it does not necessarily mean that all compacts are 
preemptable. However it probably does mean that water allocation 
compacts can be preempted, since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Sporhase v. Nebraska 130 clearly makes state water rights subject to 
congressional control under the negative commerce clause. 131 One must 
assume that an interstate compact provides little protection for state water 
rights against congressional interference. 132 Dan Tarlock explains: 
[S]tate interests recognized in a compact may be subject to federal 
policies articulated after the compact was negotiated. The federal 
government has the power to apportion interstate waters, and therefore 
no state rights are vested against federal apportionment. Any state 
water rights, be they based on state law or an interstate compact, 
125. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. United States, 758 F.2d 508, 514 (lOth Cir. 1985) ("[A] 
decision on the question of the impact of the interstate compact would be premature."). 
126. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 685. 
127. !d. at 726-27. 
128. 59 U.S. 421 (1855). 
129. Id. at 433. 
130. 458 U.S. 491 (1982). 
131. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 24. 
132. Grant, supra note 21, at 556. 
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therefore remain subject to subsequent diminution by Congress, if 
Congress decides to use this power. 133 
345 
Though traditionally deferential to state water law, Congress could 
preempt state law under the Commerce Clause. The Riverside decisions 
indicate that water allocations under congressionally approved interstate 
compacts "may not be as firm as they were once thought to be. " 134 
Interstate compacts lacking congressional approval, like the compacts 
between California and Nevada allocating the water of the Truckee River 
in the Reno-Tahoe area, are even less reliable. These compacts are 
subject not only to congressional preemption, 135 but also to the regula-
tions of federal agencies. 136 
Ultimately, the question of whether federal wetlands regulation 
significantly burdens state water rights is largely academic; any interfer-
ence with state rights is important to the extent that landowners and water 
rights holders think it poses a threat to their rights. The perceived threat 
of a section 404 permit denial creates something analogous to a cloud on 
private title to water rights. Good water policy should recognize that the 
threat itself, despite, or even because of, the fact that it is exaggerated, 
may significantly impact the efficient development of water resources. 
The threat of regulatory interference decreases the value of state water 
rights insofar as potential developers think the threat is real. 
What is the solution to this difficult problem? Reducing federal 
regulation of state water under section 404 is not the answer. Even if 
Congress could be persuaded to amend section 404, or if the courts could 
be persuaded to read the statute more narrowly-and they have made it 
emphatically clear that they have no such intention-an effort to 
circumvent wetlands protection would be counterproductive. As 
frustrating as it may be to private developers faced with a section 404 
permit denial, wetlands represent a valuable and increasingly rare national 
treasure, well worth the price of their protection. Instead of trying to 
circumvent federal regulations or have them repealed, lawyers and state 
water administrators should direct their efforts toward creating the 
133. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 25. 
134. /d.at24n.119. 
135. See Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
618, 104 Stat. 3294 (1990), discussed in Charles Harlow, If At First You Don't Succeed: 
Resolving Water Quality Issues in the Lake Tahoe Basin Through Interstate Allocation and 
Regional Development Compacts 12 (Dec. 16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, copy on file 
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library). 
136. E.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 
1984) (upholding a decision of the Secretary of the Interior requiring the release of storage 
water intended for municipal use in order to maintain sufficient water levels in Pyramid Lake 
to preserve the endangered lahontan cutthroat trout). 
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maximum amount of stability in water rights while allowing for the 
possibility of federal interference with those rights. This Comment 
supports the proposition that interstate compacts, or more particularly, 
federal-interstate compacts, create one of the best opportunities to achieve 
this end. 
V. AN INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH TO WETLANDS PROTECTION 
Industrial landowners and users . . . are inclined to wail long and 
loudly about the extension of government ownership and regulation to 
land, but ... they show little disposition to develop the only visible 
alternative: the voluntary practice of conservation on their own lands. 
When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act 
for the good of the community, he today assents only with outstretched 
palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs 
only fore-thought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least 
debateable. 137 
A. Is Federal Regulation Really Necessary? 
It has been suggested that perhaps the best way to protect state and 
local water rights and land use from federal wetlands regulation is to put 
the permitting program in the hands of the states .138 In fact, subsec-
tions (g) through (i) of section 404139 provide for state administration 
of the program upon approval by the EPA, but because the Corps must 
retain jurisdiction over actually navigable waters, this amounts to only a 
partial delegation of federal authority, and only one state, Michigan, has 
chosen this route. 140 Some argue that federal standards should be 
relaxed to facilitate state administration of the program, but there are 
good reasons for preserving federal control over the section 404 
permitting process. Many of the values represented in wetlands are 
federal and interstate in nature. 141 Historically, state and local water 
users have tended to ignore interstate and national interests in wetlands 
preservation and have pursued their own interests in development. 142 
As a result, the federal government has assumed many of the functions 
necessary to protect these vital ecosystems. 143 
137. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 50. 
138. TRELEASE & GOULD, supra note 48, at 760; see also Sanderson, supra note 19. 
139. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g)-(i) (1988). 
140. 49 Fed. Reg. 39,012 (1984). 
141. Wood, supra note 56, at 10-11. 
142. !d. at 11. 
143. !d. 
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I. The interested parties 
State regulatory commissions that administer interstate compacts and 
states that contemplate drafting interstate water compacts need to be 
aware of the possibility that water rights allocated under interstate 
compacts may be disrupted by federal environmental regulations, 
including wetlands regulation under section 404. For an interstate 
compact to be truly effective it must be comprehensive-that is, it must 
deal with all aspects of water regulation within the river system. 144 
This means the agreement should cover groundwater145 and atmospheric 
water, 146 as well as surface water. It also means that compacts should 
recognize and address water quantity and water quality issues, as well as 
related environmental interests. An interstate compact cannot pretend to 
be comprehensive unless it addresses federal rights-both reserved rights 
and regulatory powers such as those administered under section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act. New interstate compacts should be drafted and 
existing compacts should be amended to provide maximum stability to 
individual water rights while preserving the equitable allocation of water 
among compact states. These provisions must be broad enough to deal 
both with the effects of current regulatory programs such as section 404, 
and with the possibility of future environmental legislation that may 
disturb what states and individuals presume to be their settled water 
rights. 
2. The compact solution 
The question then arises, how can an interstate compact that is itself 
subject to federal regulation mitigate the effects of that regulation on state 
water rights and interstate allocation? It is the thesis of this Comment 
that the most effective way to stabilize water rights is through federal-
144. McCormick, supra note 98, at 392-94. 
145. According to Douglas Grant, only three interstate compacts currently deal with 
groundwater resources at all. They are (1) the Amended Bear River Compact arts. V(A), 
VI(B), 94 Stat. 4, 10-11 (1980); (2) the Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact art. V(5.2), 
86 Stat. 193, 196-97 (1972); and (3) the Upper Niobrara River Compact art. VI(A), 83 Stat. 
86, 89 (1969). Grant, supra note 21, at 556-57. However, both of the federal-interstatecom-
pacts "treat groundwater on a par with surface water." /d.; see Delaware River Basin Compact 
§§ 1.2(i), 3.3(a), 10.1, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat. 688,690,692,699 (1961); Susquehanna 
River Basin Compact§§ 1.2(9), 3.3, 3.4(2)-(5), 4.2(a), 10.1, 11.1 to 11.5, Pub. L. No. 91-
575, 84 Stat. 1509, 1511, 1513, 1514, 1515, 1518, 1523, 1524, (1970). 
146. No current compact mentions atmospheric water resources, Grant, supra note 21, 
at 556, but a model state law compact on weather modification has been written and is 
supported by the American Society of Civil Engineers. RAY lAY DAVIS, FUTURE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION (1988). 
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interstate compacts, compacts between two or more states and the federal 
government. 147 By making the federal government a party to a com-
pact, water allocation and development decisions can be coordinated from 
the beginning with federal interests in mind, rather than having state 
allocations and individual expectations disrupted by a section 404 denial 
or an EPA veto in the later stages of a development plan. 148 Further-
more, while the federal government is unlikely to fully abandon its 
regulatory powers to an interstate commission, 149 a federal-interstate 
compact commission could provide state water administrators an 
opportunity to participate in the federal regulatory process. 
The federal-interstate compacts now in existence have been roundly 
praised by commentators and have more than fulfilled the expectations of 
the signatory states. 150 The principle model of a successful federal-
interstate compact is the Delaware River Compact, signed by Pennsylva-
nia, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. 151 It resulted in the 
creation of a powerful compact commission, with broad regulatory 
powers over all aspects of the water within the basin, including power to 
allocate the waters of the river. 152 
The Delaware River Compact was successfully used as the model for 
the Susquehanna River Compact. 153 However, these compacts involve 
only eastern states and deal mostly with water quality issues rather than 
water quantity or allocation. Some question whether the federal-interstate 
model would work in the more arid western states. 154 State govern-
ments in the West tend to mistrust the federal government and are 
especially resentful of federal power over natural resources such as water. 
Zachary McCormick argues that western states have traditionally been 
very stingy both in funding interstate compact commissions and in the 
delegation of state sovereignty to those commissions. He maintains that 
western states would therefore be unlikely candidates for the kind of 
broad-ranging federal-interstate compacts that have been so successful in 
the East. 155 Western intransigence is admittedly an obstacle to the 
147. TRELEASE & GOULD, supra note 48, at 620-22, gives a good explanation and a short 
history of the development of federal-interstate compacts. 
148. Muys, supra note 108, at 324-25. 
149. TRELEASE & GOULD, supra note 48, at 622. 
150. Muys, supra note 108, at 313-14. 
151. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). 
152. !d. at 692-93. 
153. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970); see 
Sherk, supra note 108, at 402-03 (1994) (citing SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
PUBLIC FORUM: THE SRBC COMES OF AGE-21 YEARS OF SERVICE TO WATER USERS OF THE 
BASIN (1992)). 
154. McCormick, supra note 98, at 394. 
155. !d. 
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federal-interstate compact, but not an insurmountable one. In fact, there 
is no reason why a federal-interstate compact could not work in the West 
as well as it has worked in the East, and in many ways the peculiar 
conditions of western politics and the western climate make the federal-
interstate compact solution particularly suited to the west. 156 
The abiding mistrust of western landowners and political leaders may 
make the negotiation of federal-interstate compacts more difficult, but this 
is no reason to dismiss the possibility entirely. The mistrust of all things 
federal can be overcome; for as westerners are fond of saying, "we may 
be dumb but we're not stupid. " 157 Even westerners will accept a 
federal-interstate compact they think is fair, especially if they believe the 
compact is the best way to protect state water rights. 
But first, western water rights holders must be dispossessed of any 
quixotic delusions of resurgent federalism and states' rights. 158 Despite 
what many westerners may think, the overwhelming consensus of the 
legal community is that Congress has ample power under the Commerce 
and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution to simply occupy the field of 
water allocation and preempt state law altogether. 159 This may seem 
like a political impossibility at this point, especially considering the 
elections of November 8, 1994, but Congresses come and Congresses go; 
the environment is here to stay. 160 If states continue to ignore federal 
interests, especially environmental interests, the political tide may quickly 
turn against them. 161 Clearly state governments would be well-advised 
to learn to compromise with the federal government on water uses. 
Interestingly, Jerome Muys suggests that the federal-interstate compact 
is a desirable solution particularly in the West because the federal 
government already has such powerful rights and interests in water 
allocation. 162 State participation in the federal process can only increase 
a state's influence over largely discretionary agency regulatory decisions. 
156. Muys, supra note 108, at 311; see also Olen Paul Matthews, Judicial Resolution of 
Transboundary Water Conflicts, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL., 375, 382 (1994). 
157. I wish I could cite convincing authority for this proposition, but unfortunately, 
examples from natural resources law tend to prove just the opposite. I will just have to assert 
it on my own authority, which, as a Utahn, may be suspect. 
158. See Muys, supra note 108, at 325. 
159. MacDonnell, supra note 61, at 411; Muys, supra note 108, at 315; Tarlock, supra 
note 59, at 24-25; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 726-27. 
160. At least we hope so. If it does go away we will not be far behind. 
161. While commentators have been warning states for years that the their persistent 
failure to recognize federal interests could result in federal preemption of state water law, the 
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 
3295 (1990), is a current case in point. See Harlow, supra note 135, at 12-15. 
162. Muys, supra note 108, at 311. 
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Another objection raised to federal-interstate compacts is the fear that 
federal agencies will not be willing to participate in negotiations that will 
place limitations on their currently unquantified, and thus unlimited water 
rights under the reserved rights doctrine and various regulatory pro-
grams. 163 Paul Bloom suggests that Congress should enact legislation 
forcing all agencies with reserved claims on certain streams to quantify 
those claims so the rest of river can be allocated under state law. 164 In 
effect, this would create a de facto federal-interstate compact. 
Zachary McCormick has criticized this approach as going too 
far. 165 McCormick argues that rather than make the federal govern-
ment a signatory party to an interstate compact, compacts should merely 
contain a provision requiring the federal agencies to recognize, with 
certain reservations, the interstate allocation and state water law. 166 
This approach has been used before on the Republican167 and Belle 
Fourche River Compacts, 168 approved in 1943 and 1944 respectively, 
and McCormick suggests that the same approach should be used to 
protect state water interests today. 169 However it seems unlikely that 
even a conservative Republican Congress would countenance such broad 
restrictions on federal power in the 1990s. Most of the older interstate 
compacts are "so environmentally outdated" that Congress probably 
would not approve a similar agreement today. 170 
This point is illustrated by the interminable negotiations over the 
Truckee River Compact. Congress rejected proposed compacts 
containing provisions similar to those in the Republican and Belle 
Fourche River Compacts that would have limited federal interference with 
state water law. 171 Although the compact was drafted in cooperation 
with a representative of the federal government172 and was ratified by 
163. McCormick, supra note 98, at 393. 
164. Paul Bloom, Law of the Range: A Critique of an Extraordinary Legal System, in 
NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 139 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 
1986), in McCormick, supra note 98, at 393. 
165. McCormick, supra note 98, at 393. 
166. /d. at 394. 
167. Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 60, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (between 
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska). 
168. Belle Fourche River Compact, Pub. L. No. 236, ch. 64, 58 Stat. 94 (1944) (between 
South Dakota and Wyoming). 
169. /d. 
170. Sherk, supra note 108, at 406, (quoting Jerome C. Muys, Approaches and 
Considerations for Allocation of Interstate Waters (forthcoming 1994)). 
171. John Kramer, Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and Pyramid Lake: the Past, Present 
and Future of Interstate Water Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1339, 1363-64 n.101 (1988). 
172. /d. at 1364. 
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both Nevada and California, 173 Congress did not ratify it because it 
failed to adequately address federal water rights in the Truckee River 
basin. 174 The particular federal rights in question were Indian reserved 
rights claimed by the Paiute tribe, and water to protect threatened and 
endangered fish species in Pyramid lake. Such values were of little 
concern when the compact was first drafted in the early 1960s. But by 
the time the compact was finalized, Indian rights and species protection 
were important political issues, and Congress would not approve it. 175 
Since 1971, California and Nevada have been unsuccessful in 
obtaining congressional approval of the Truckee compact. 176 Ironically, 
in 1979 Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus suggested the adoption of a 
federal-interstate compact for the Truckee River Basin modeled on the 
Delaware River Basin Compact. 177 The states rejected this option, so 
ultimately Congress imposed its own water allocation statute in 1990. 178 
The history of the Truckee River suggests that modern interstate 
compacts that attempt to coerce federal recognition of state water rights 
might not obtain the necessary congressional approval. 
The Truckee River history shows one reason states should negotiate 
federal-interstate compacts, but it does not necessarily provide a reason 
for federal agencies to negotiate. Ultimately, a congressional mandate 
forcing federal agencies to co-operate with state and local agencies in 
quantifying federal reserved rights may be necessary. But a one-time 
quantification such as Bloom suggests may be inadequate to protect 
federal interests; for example, compact negotiators can not foresee all of 
the effects of potential water developments on current or future endan-
gered species. 179 Instead, an ongoing system of oversight and coopera-
173. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 538.600 (Michie 1986); CAL. WATER CODE§ 5976 
(West 1971). 
174. Kramer, supra note 171, at 1364-67. 
175. /d. at 1367. 
176. /d. at 1371-76. 
177. See Pyramid Lake Paiute and Truckee River Settlement Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 
1558 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Public Lands, Reserved Water, and Resource 
Conservation of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 277-81 
(letter from Cecil D. Andrus to James T. Mcintyre, Director, Office of Management and 
Budget (May 25, 1979)) [hereinafter Andrus], (quoted in Kramer, supra note 171, at 1370 
n.124). 
178. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 
104 Stat. 3295 (1990). See Harlow, supra note 135, at 12-15. 
179. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (danger to snail 
darter species discovered after construction of Tellico Dam was under way). It is impossible 
for biologists to know enough about where and how all endangered species live to quantify 
their water appropriation needs in advance. Biological inquiries are usually not undertaken 
until a project is proposed and the process is triggered by the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(l) 
(1988). 
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tion between the federal government and the states is needed. 180 For 
water regulation under the Clean Water Act, the legislation coercing 
federal participation in such a system may already be in place. 
The Wallop Amendment states that "the authority of each State to 
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, 
abrogated, or otherwise impaired," 181 and that "nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water 
which have been established by any State." 182 Both imperatives are 
qualified by language characterizing them as merely "the policy of 
Congress. " 183 But Congress did not similarly qualify the concluding 
language of the statute, which commands unequivocally that "[f]ederal 
agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop 
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in 
concert with programs for managing water resources. " 184 States may 
be able to compel federal participation and cooperation in compact 
negotiations under the Wallop Amendment. 
An observation made by George Sherk pertaining to the Delaware 
River Basin Compact suggests a final argument for federal-interstate 
compacts in the West. Sherk noted that existing federal-interstate 
compacts have helped redefine the relationship between the federal 
government and member states in positive ways. 185 Because it allows 
the various state and federal agencies an opportunity to meet and work 
through problems in a setting of cooperation rather than competition, the 
federal-interstate compact may actually reduce animosities and tensions 
between member states and the federal government. One does not want 
to pin too many expectations on a single agreement, but anything that 
might help redefine the relationship between federal and state govern-
ments in the West should be pursued. Sherk suggests that the model 
interstate stream compact being prepared by the American Society of 
Civil Engineers should be a federal-interstate compact. 186 The rest of 
this Comment explores the ways an interstate or federal-interstate 
compact might address the problem of federal wetlands protection and 
state water rights. 
180. Muys, supra note 108, at 324-25. 
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988). 
182. /d. 
183. /d.; see also supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
184. /d. (emphasis added). 
185. Sherk, supra note 108, at 406. 
186. /d. at 406-07. 
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B. A Wetlands Protection Proposal for Interstate and Federal-
Interstate Compacts 
353 
Wetlands protection under section 404 of the Clean Water Act 
provides an excellent example of how an interstate or federal-interstate 
compact might resolve the conflict between federal regulation and state 
law. Successful resolution of the wetlands question may suggest ways to 
resolve other state-federal water rights conflicts. One of the aspects of 
interstate compacts that Frankfurter and Landis praised was the ability to 
creatively resolve conflicts not easily addressed by strict application of 
legal principles. 187 This means that interstate and federal-interstate 
water commissions could work to achieve compromises between 
competing interests rather than simply choosing one interest over the 
other as often happens in the judicial setting. 
Clearly some kind of equitable compromise is needed to address the 
wetlands preservation issue under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
Such a compromise should evaluate the problem in terms of who bears 
the cost, and who benefits from the various wetlands values that the 
particular policy either protects or allows to be developed. Federal 
regulation of private water rights under section 404 has often been 
justified by the fact that wetlands preservation serves interests that are 
interstate, national, or in the case of some environmental protection 
measures, international in scope. 188 However, local and state interests 
usually stand to gain more by developing wetlands than by protecting 
them, at least in the short term. 189 If wetlands are to be saved at all, 
they will be saved by those who recognize an interstate or national 
interest in their preservation and are relatively disinterested in local 
development projects. Clearly, wetlands have received far greater and 
more effective protection under federal authority than they would under 
exclusively state laws. 190 
However, a state prevented from diverting its share of interstate 
waters, or an individual who loses the ability to develop private water 
rights based on interstate or national interests should not have to bear the 
full brunt of the loss. By arguing that federal protection is necessary to 
protect wetlands, conservationists acknowledge that wetlands regulation 
serves national and interstate interests at the expense of local and intra-
state interests. If the benefits claimed by wetlands protection are in fact 
187. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 706. 
188. Wood, supra note 56, at 10-11. 
189. !d. at 11. 
190. Beck, supra note 9, at 548-51. 
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interstate and national, the costs should not be all intrastate and local. To 
the extent that all states in the basin or drainage area benefit from the 
protection of wetlands on interstate streams, all should share in the cost 
of protecting them. To the extent that the nation as a whole profits from 
environmental benefits of wetlands protection, the federal government 
should share in the costs of that protection. But so far, courts have been 
hesitant to characterize wetlands preservation as a "taking" or to impose 
the costs of compensation on the federal government. To do so would 
make the cost of wetlands preservation prohibitive, thus defeating a clear 
congressional imperative and possibly resulting in the permanent loss of 
many of our greatest national treasures in exchange for an increased 
number of mini-malls. 
This Comment suggests two possible compact provisions aimed at 
resolving conflicts between state water allocation and federal wetlands 
protection. The first (see Appendix 1) is a simple measure designed to 
equitably distribute the burden of wetlands protection between states when 
that protection affects water allocations under interstate compacts. 191 
The second, (see Appendix 2) is a more comprehensive and ambitious 
approach and requires the cooperation of the federal government. This 
suggestion attempts to get at the root of the problem-the instability of 
state water rights in light of federal wetlands protection. 192 
1. Federal burdens on interstate streams: sharing the costs 
When wetlands preservation policies result in a section 404 permit 
denial that affects interstate water allocation, this is a determination made 
in the interests of flood protection and water quality enhancement that 
benefits all the states that use the water of that stream. The burdens 
therefore should be shared proportionally among the states instead of 
falling exclusively on the state where the permit was denied. This burden 
apportionment could be accomplished through a simple provision in most 
interstate compacts and need not involve the federal government. 193 
Interstate water compacts should provide that when the federal 
government prevents a state from diverting water allocated to it by 
interstate compact to protect downstream wetlands, each state's allotment 
should be reduced accordingly. This principle could be applied generally 
to federal interests in state water, though perhaps not as well for federal 
Indian reserved rights, which serve local citizens and state interests. The 
idea of sharing the burden of federal interests between states is not new. 
191. See Appendix 1: Model Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision, infra. 
192. See Appendix 2: Model Federal-Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision, infra. 
193. See Appendix 1, infra. 
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The Department of Interior, in comments on the provisional draft of the 
Truckee River Compact submitted to federal agencies in 1965, "recom-
mended that federal uses of water be a claim on the entire interstate 
stream system and not be charged only against the allocation of the state 
where the uses are made. " 194 
This proposal recognizes that interstate interests such as water 
quality, wildlife, flood protection, and resource conservation are often 
synonymous with federal interests. It would also provide a disincentive 
to states that hope to circumvent interstate compact allocations by 
manipulating federal environmental protection statutes or lodging spurious 
environmental claims. 195 States whose own allocation will be reduced 
by a section 404 permit denial in an upstream state will be less likely to 
argue for federal water rights on an interstate stream. 
2. A national interest in state resources: compensating private parties 
Federal-interstate compact commissions are in a unique position to 
fairly balance the burdens incident to wetlands protection. The Model 
Federal-Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision suggested by this 
Comment should be understood as merely one way in which federal-
interstate compact commissions could address the problem of stabilizing 
state water rights against the threat of federal regulation. No compact 
presently in existence dabbles in the minutiae of federal regulatory 
decision-making to the extent that the proposed compact provision does. 
Perhaps these suggestions are better suited for service in the by-laws of 
a federal-interstate compact commission than as part of the compact itself. 
The key here is that only a federal-interstate compact can provide the 
kind of versatility that would allow parties to reach the most equitable 
and creative solutions to their water-use conflicts. 
For instance, when a local use is sacrificed for a national interest, the 
federal government should compensate landowners and holders of water 
rights for the reasonable value of water "condemned" to wetland 
uses. 196 This approach to wetlands protection is also not without 
precedent. Similar measures providing for the purchase of "conservation 
easements" have been included in the federal "swampbuster" incen-
194. Kramer, supra note 171, at 1365 (citing Andrus, supra note 177). 
195. See Tarlock, supra note 59, at 20 (suggesting that the litigation in Riverside 
Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1985), "arose when Nebraska discov-
ered that downstream irrigators on the Platte River could be better protected under the wing 
of the endangered whooping crane than by litigating the allocation of the river under interstate 
compacts and the doctrine of equitable apportionment"). 
196. See Appendix 2, infra at III.l.(b). 
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tives, 197 in state wetlands preservation statutes, 198 and in the Truckee-
Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act. 199 Federal-
interstate compacts should contain provisions requiring compact members 
to negotiate a reasonable rate of compensation that could be applied 
uniformly without resort to legal condemnation proceedings?00 
Thus far, judicial resolution has created a situation in which no one 
comes out ahead except the lawyers and one or two lucky plaintiffs. In 
most instances compensation is denied, but when landowners obtain a 
"regulatory taking" ruling, it can be extremely expensive for the 
government. 201 Federal-interstate compacts can work out solutions to this 
problem that are fair to both sides. A compact commission could 
establish a "condemnation" price for wetlands conservation easements in 
which landowners and water rights holders would not get the full value 
of the land or the water right put to its highest economic use. Instead, 
they would be compensated at some considerably lower rate-perhaps a 
rate analogous to the cost of the unimproved land. 
Through a federal-interstate compact, the costs of wetlands protection 
could be shared equitably among the interested parties. The principles 
guiding this compensation should reflect the interests of the various 
parties. 202 All the wetlands values to be considered in Corps decisions 
would be allocated among the parties according to whose interests are 
protected. 203 The interests of each compact member would be repre-
sented by different categories of wetlands values, and each party to the 
contract might be allotted a certain number of points to "bid" for those 
values it wanted represented in the Corps decision.204 For example, 
endangered species protection might be more in the national interest and 
less in the interest of states. Other interests might be shared by several 
197. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat. 3359) §§ 1431, 1438-40, 1461-63 (amending 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1231, 3831, 1001-09); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 319 (praising the acts for 
"appealing to farmers who must survive economically," and for "finally placing inherent value 
on the land to ensure a public benefit for the nation"). 
198. See Chown, Protecting Wetlands with Conservation Easements, GREAT LAKES 
WETLANDS, Spring 1990. at 3, col. 1, cited in Beck, supra note 8, at 553. 
199. Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3295 (1990), quoted in Harlow, supra note 136, at 
12. 
200. See Appendix 2, infra, at III.l.(b). 
201. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1847 (Cl. Ct. 
1990) ($2.5 million compensation awarded for section 404 permit denial). But see Florida 
Rock Indus. v. United States, 31 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1835 (Cl. Ct. 1990) ($1 million 
award for regulatory taking caused by § 404 permit denial), vacated by Florida Rock Indus. 
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994). 
202. See Appendix 2 infra part II.1.(a)-(b). 
203. See Appendix 2 infra part II.2-3. 
204. See Appendix 2 infra part Il.2. 
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parties. Wildlife protection might be partly in the federal interest and 
partly in the interest of the states. Protection of fish and game wildlife 
within a state might be worth more to the state than protection of species 
outside the state. States might even sell part of their bid allotment to 
private developers or divide it among agencies or competing special 
interest groups within the state. If local landowners' interests are best 
represented by development values, they can pay to have those values 
represented in the Corps' decision. The final decision would still rest 
with the Corps,205 but this decision also would have to be represented 
by a bid. 206 
The significance of the bid is that it represents not only the right to 
have one's interests represented, but also the responsibility to pay for 
those benefits that are in one's interest. If the Corps decided to deny a 
permit application, it would be required to justify its decision by 
providing a breakdown of its rationale in terms of the values the decision 
was meant to protect. 207 Landowners and water right holders affected 
by permit denial would be compensated, but the cost of compensation 
could be readily divided among the federal government and any other 
parties with interests represented in the decision. 208 The costs of 
protecting each value represented in the Corps' evaluation would be 
allocated among the parties according to their bids. On the other hand, 
decisions to develop a wetland would require indemnification to offset the 
cost of wetlands mitigation and maintenance from the local landowner or 
other parties with interests represented in that decision?09 The details 
of the compensation plan would have to be worked out by the members 
of the compact and would be renegotiated at regular intervals. 210 The 
compensation plan would contain a formula to guide the commission in 
205. This can be assured by allotting the federal representative a majority of the points 
and permitting them to bid after all other parties have made their bids. See Appendix 2 infra 
part II.2.(a)-(c). 
206. See Appendix 2 infra part III. 
207. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(a). 
208. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(b)(i)-(ii). 
209. See Appendix 2 infra part III.2.(b)(i)-(ii). Oliver Houck suggests that a three to one 
ratio is necessary because of the uncertain success of artificial wetlands, and because of the 
need to restore wetlands already lost. While I agree that a three to one ratio is desirable and 
even necessary to restore the massive amount of wetlands already lost, it does not seem fair 
to require those seeking a permit today to pay for the losses of the past two hundred years. 
A two to one mitigation ratio would prevent further wetlands losses, taking into account the 
uncertainty involved in wetlands mitigation efforts. The costs of wetlands restoration should 
be shared by the nation as a whole. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of 
Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 
U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 838-39 (1989). 
210. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(b). 
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determining which parties were responsible for compensation and for how 
much. 
Compensating landowners for wetlands preservation may be less 
expensive to the government than defending itself in a takings situation, 
and landowners and water rights holders will not go uncompensated for 
their lost expectations. By establishing a fixed rate of compensation, 
legal costs to both sides can be avoided. By keeping the compensation 
rates low, the government can protect itself against spurious developers 
who buy wetlands and then look for a windfall by claiming a loss of 
beneficial use. Furthermore, anyone who acquired wetlands after either 
state or federal wetlands legislation was in place should be estopped from 
arguing that the legislation took away the value of developing their land 
or water right. 211 
The federal government should be safe from takings claims under 
this compact provision for the same reasons that it is safe today,212 but 
it will enjoy the added protection of having paid a reasonable amount for 
lost potential uses. By compensating landowners who cannot develop 
their wetlands, the government insures against the possibility of having 
to defend itself in various takings actions. The money saved by 
eliminating such takings claims could probably pay the compensation rate 
for the approximately 500 dredge and fill projects that are denied each 
year. 213 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Like winds and sunsets, wild things were taken for granted until 
progress began to do away with them. Now we face the question 
whether a still higher 'standard of living' is worth its cost in things 
natural, wild, and free. For us of the minority, the opportunity to see 
geese is more important than television, and the chance to find a 
pas que-flower is a right as inalienable as free speech. 214 
To the degree that wetlands preservation protects the interests of all 
the water users on an interstate stream, states should equally share the 
burden of that protection. Interstate compact commissions are in a 
unique position to oversee the reallocation of waters among compact 
states incident to a section 404 permit denial that affects interstate water 
allocation. 
211. Appendix 2 infra part Il.l.(b). 
212. See supra discussion accompanying notes 90-106. 
213. See Wood, supra note 56, at 54-55. 
214. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at xvii. 
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If we truly believe that wetlands protection is in the national interest, 
then we must continue to look for less burdensome ways of protecting 
them, and the cost of that protection should be shared by the nation as a 
whole-that is, by the federal government. If we are unwilling to share 
the cost of protecting wetlands, then perhaps wetlands protection is not 
as much in the public interest as Congress has presumed it to be. I 
believe the American people have recognized the value of wetlands 
protection and are willing to pay for it. Wetlands are a national treasure 
well worth the price of their preservation. However, we should not 
expect farmers and the water users to bear the full burden of benefits 
enjoyed by the whole nation. Federal-interstate compacts can provide 
various and dynamic methods of reallocating these costs. 
Erik G. Davis 
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APPENDIX 1: MODEL INTERSTATE COMPACT WETLANDS PROVISION 
I. Federal water uses within the Basin shall be considered a claim on 
the entire interstate stream system and shall not be charged to the 
allocation of the state where the uses are made. 
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APPENDIX 2: MODEL FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT WETLANDS 
PROVISION 
I. COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL WETLANDS LAWS. No 
provision of this compact and no agreements reached under this 
compact shall be construed in any way to excuse or reduce the 
liability of any party or their duties to comply with all applicable 
state and federal laws and regulations for the purpose of wetlands 
protection and preservation. 
II. BIDDING ON THE WEIGHT OF EVALUATION FACTORS. As part of the 
Public Interest Review required under 33 C.P.R. § 320.4 and the 
Evaluation required by § 404(b)(l) of the Clean Water Act, the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers shall take and weigh the bids 
of all state parties to the Compact before approving or denying a 
proposal under § 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
1. WETLANDS VALUES. For each project that comes before the 
commission, the compact commission shall prepare two lists of 
wetlands values, one listing the values represented by the proposed 
development, and one listing those values threatened by the project. 
(a) EVALUATION CRITERIA. These values shall include but shall not 
be limited to those wetlands functions important to the public and 
private interest as set forth in the laws of states party to the compact 
and the United States Army Corps of Engineers' General Policies for 
Evaluating Permit Applications.' 
(b) ADDITIONAL VALUES. Other values associated with wetlands and 
deemed to be of particular relevance to the proposal at hand may be 
added to the lists by any party to the compact. Parties to the 
compact may also remove any values from the lists that they deem 
to be irrelevant to the proposed project as long as no other party 
objects to the removal. The identities of those moving to add values 
to or remove values from the lists and the identities of parties object-
ing to removal shall be secret. 
1. "All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the 
cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general 
environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, 
flood-plain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply 
and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral 
needs, considerations of property ownership." 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a). 
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2. BIDDING. Each project application that comes before the Commis-
sion shall be subject to an evaluation by the compact parties. Each 
party to the compact shall be allotted a certain number of "points." 
A party may use these points to "bid" for those values of particular 
concern to the party. Bidding shall be done according to the 
following procedural rules: 
(a) ALLOCATION OF BID POINTS TO THE FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
The bid allocation of the federal representative shall be no less than 
51 points. 
(b) ALLOCATION OF BID POINTS TO STATE PARTIES. The combined 
bid allocation of the all the state parties to the compact shall be no 
more than forty-nine points, divided equally among state parties to 
the compact, with a remainder of one point to the state in which the 
action is proposed. 2 
(c) BIDDING PERIOD. The federal representative shall designate a 
time after which no bids may be received. This time shall be after 
the Public Notice, Comment Period, Public Interest Review, and 
Evaluation Period required by the statute and regulations, but it shall 
be before the acceptance or denial of the application. Bids shall 
remain open and subject to change by the parties until the designated 
time. The federal representative shall bid after all state bids are 
received. 
3. (a) BIDS. Each bid shall consist of two parts: 
(i) an allocation of points for and/or against the proposal; and 
(ii) a justification or allocation of points among one or more of the 
wetlands values contained on the lists promulgated pursuant to 
section II .1. The total of points bid by any party may not surpass 
the party's bid allotment as determined in subsections 11.2(b) or 
11.2(c). 
(b) OPEN AND CLOSED BALLOTS. During the bidding period the tally 
of points bid both for and against the proposal shall be public 
information. However, the allocation of points bid towards each of 
the listed values shall remain secret until all state parties have bid. 
The federal representative shall bid after all state parties have bid. 
2. Thus if there are two state parties to the compact, the state in which the project is 
to be constructed would be allotted 25% of the state bid and the other party would be allotted 
24%. If there were three state parties to the compact, the "home" state would get 17% of the 
state bid, and the other states would get 16% each. If there are four state parties the allocation 
is 13% to the "home" state, 12% to the rest. If the number of states in the compact is 5, 7, 
9, 10, or any other number that leaves a remainder of more than one, then the percentage of 
the bid allotted to the states can be adjusted. For example, five states would divide the bid 
such that the "home" state got 10% and the other four got 9.75% each. 
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(c) ABSTENTIONS. Any party to the compact may abstain from 
bidding on an application with the following exceptions: 
(i) The federal representative may not abstain from bidding unless it 
is shown by substantial evidence that the project will involve no 
adverse impact to any wetlands functions important to the public 
interest as delineated in 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(b).3 
(ii) State parties may not abstain from bidding unless it is shown by 
substantial evidence that the proposed project will produce no 
adverse impact to wetlands values protected by statutes of that 
state. 
(iii) Any party that adds a new value to either list shall be required 
to allocate a given percentage of its points to that value. 
III. PROJECT APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL. All projects requiring the 
discharge of dredge and fill materials in the navigable waters of the 
Basin shall be subject to review and approval by the federal 
representative from the Corps of Engineers as required by section 
404(b) of the Clean Water Act (U.S.C. § 1344(b)). This review 
shall conform to the requirements of 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(3), in that 
the specific weight of each factor for or against the proposal shall be 
determined and reflected in the bid of the federal representative. 
1. PROJECT DISAPPROVAL. If the total of points bid by all parties 
against the proposed project is greater than the total of points bid for 
it, the project shall be disapproved and the § 404 permit denied. 
3. Wetlands considered to perform functions important to the public interest under this 
section include: 
(i) Wetlands which serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain 
production, general habitat and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic 
or land species; 
(ii) Wetlands set aside for study of the aquatic environment or as sanctuaries or 
refuges; 
(iii) Wetlands the destruction or alteration of which would affect detrimentally natural 
drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns, salinity distribution, flushing 
characteristics, current patterns, or other environmental characteristics; 
(iv) Wetlands which are significant in shielding other areas from wave action, erosion, 
or storm damage. Such wetlands are often associated with barrier beaches, islands, 
reefs and bars; 
(v) Wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters; 
(vi) Wetlands which are ground water discharge areas that maintain minimum 
baseflows important to aquatic resources and those which are prime natural recharge 
areas; 
(vii) Wetlands which serve significant water purification functions; and 
(viii) Wetlands which are unique in nature or scarce in quality to the region or local 
area. 
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When a permit for any project is denied, a Memorandum of 
Rationale shall be prepared by the commission identifying and 
quantifying the reasons for the permit denial. 
a. MEMORANDUM OF RATIONALE. The Memorandum of Rationale 
shall reflect the bids of all the parties that opposed the proposal, and 
shall contain the following: 
(i) An enumeration of specific wetlands values threatened by the 
proposed project as set forth in section 11.1. 
(ii) A percentage-based quantification of the weight given to each 
wetlands preservation value by the parties bidding to deny the 
permit. 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a)(3). 
b. COMPENSATION TO PRIVATE LANDOWNERS AND WATER RIGHTS 
HOLDERS. Every five years, or at any interval agreed to by the 
parties to this compact, the Commission shall establish a fixed and 
uniform rate of compensation for landowners and water rights 
holders who acquired the property or water right that is the subject 
of the permit application before applicable state or federal wetlands 
preservation statutes were enacted and who are denied the full use of 
their property because of a section 404 permit denial. 
(i) Compensation shall be based on the present value of the land or 
water right, but need not represent the highest economic use of the 
property. 
(ii) The cost of compensation shall be divided among those parties 
that opposed the project in proportion to their bids for wetlands 
values listed as threatened by the proposed project. 
2. PROJECT APPROVAL. If the total of all bids in favor of the proposed 
development is greater than those opposed, the Corps of Engineers 
shall approve the project. Whenever any project in the Basin is 
approved, and before actual work in the Basin is permitted to take 
place, the Commission shall prepare a Memorandum of Rationale 
identifying and quantifying the reasons for the permit approval. 
a. MEMORANDUM OF RATIONALE. The Memorandum of Rationale 
shall reflect the bids of all the parties that favored the proposal, and 
shall contain the following: 
(i) An enumeration of specific wetlands values served by the project 
as set forth in section II .1. 
(ii) A percentage-based quantification of the weight given to each 
wetlands development value by the parties bidding to approve the 
permit. 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a)(3). 
(iii) A showing, by substantial evidence, that the project will not 
adversely affect any listed wetlands value, or 
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(a) plans showing how adverse impacts to wetlands will be 
minimized, and 
(b) plans showing how any loss of wetlands area or values will be 
mitigated, including the cost of mitigation. 
b. WETLANDS MITIGATION. Wetlands acreage shall be mitigated at 
a ratio to be decided by the commission but not less than three acres 
of new wetlands of equal or greater biological productivity shall be 
created for every acre of wetlands destroyed or seriously impacted 
by the project. 
(i) Before actual work on any approved project begins wetlands 
mitigation as required and agreed upon by the commission 
pursuant to subsection III.2.b. shall be accomplished. If the 
parties to this compact agree that work on the project should be 
permitted to begin immediately, a bond shall be posted sufficient 
to accomplish complete mitigation as required by this compact. 
(ii) The cost of the mitigation project or the cost of the bond shall be 
divided among those parties that bid in favor of the project in 
proportion to their bids in favor of the project. 
